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A DIFFERENT STORY LINE FOR 12 ANGRYMEN: VERDICTS
REACHED BY MAJORITY RULE-THE SPANISH PERSPECTIVE
MAR JIMENO-BULNES*
INTRODUCTION
The film 12 Angry Men I deals with one of the main aspects of trial by
jury, namely, the process of deliberation. Not only does it consider the
difficulties involved in reaching a unanimous verdict under U.S. legisla-
tion, but it also points out other weaknesses of the judicial system, particu-
larly, in my view, jury prejudice towards the defendant and the indifference
of those called to perform jury service. The title 12 Angry Men appears
more realistic than the more obvious title of 12 Impartial Jurors.2 The
members of the jury are not depicted as impartial in the film and further-
more, some of them are shown to be unable to fulfill their responsibilities
as members of a jury.
Spain has adopted the classic system of trial by jury, as opposed to the
European model consisting of a mixed court with lay assessors. 3 Constitu-
tional provisions on the subject of lay participation, under Article 125, were
given expression almost twenty years after the approval of the current Con-
* Currently Associate Professor of Law at the University of Burgos (Spain) and Temporary
Judge at the Provincial Court in Burgos. Address for correspondence: Mjimeno@ubu.es. The author is
grateful to Nancy S. Marder for her thoughtful contributions to this paper as well as to Antony Ross
Price for his revising the English.
1. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957). In Spain, the title of the movie has been
translated as 12 hombres sin piedad, literally "12 men without mercy." It has been argued that the
original title in English should be translated in Spanish as Doce hombres cabreados (slang). See J.L.
GOMEZ-COLOMER, EL PERFIL DEL JURADO EN EL CINE 36 (2005).
2. See Nancy S. Marder, Why 12 Angry Men? (1957): The Transformative Power of Jury Delib-
erations, in SCREENING JUSTICE-THE CINEMA OF LAW 157 (Rennard Strickland, Teree E. Foster &
Taunya Lovell Banks eds., 2006).
3. See Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participation in Spain: The Jury System, 14 INT'L CRIM. JUST.
REV. 164, 170 (2004) [hereinafter Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participation]. For a longer Spanish version, see
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, La Participaci6n Popular en la Administraci6n de Justicia Mediante el Jurado
(C.E. art.12), 2 DOCUMENTOS PENALES Y CRIMINOL6GICOS 297 (2004). Also, for an article on the
Spanish jury as well as the Russian one, see Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The
Cases of Spain and Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (1999) [hereinafter Thaman,
Europe's New Jury Systems]. And, for a more extensive article about the Spanish jury, see Stephen C.
Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 250 (1998) [herein-
after Thaman, Spain Returns].
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stitution, in the form of the Ley Orgdnica del Tribunal del Jurado 5/1995
("LOTJ"), the Spanish jury law. 4 Nevertheless, the jury system in Spain is
to some extent unique and particularly so in the verdict phase: in the first
place, under Spanish legislation, the verdict is decided by the majority
rule;5 second, and perhaps more unusually, the verdict must be "reasoned"
in a similar way to the judicial decision itself, albeit expressed in the lan-
guage of the layperson. 6 Had 12 Angry Men been set in the context of a
Spanish courtroom, these two requirements would have radically changed
the plot of the film.
These two specific aspects of jury proceedings leading up to the ver-
dict constitute the most significant difference of the jury system in Spain,
when compared to the concept of trial by jury that evolved in the U.K. and
that was subsequently practiced in the U.S. 7 Whereas the traditional Anglo-
Saxon jury system applies the unanimity rule to a jury of twelve-above all
4. Ley Orghnica del Tribunal del Jurado (B.O.E. 1995, 122) [hereinafter LOTJ]. The Ley Or-
ginica del Tribunal del Jurado 5/1995, or Organic Law on Jury Courts, has been in force since Novem-
ber 24th, 1995 and amended twice by Organic Laws 8/1995 (November 16th) and 10/1995 (November
23rd) of the Criminal Code. Juan Alberto Belloch, the Minister of Justice at that time in Felipe Gon-
zdlez's Socialist Govemment, saw the traditional jury model as a personal challenge in contrast to the
supporters of the mixed court model, such as prestigious professors V. Fair6n Guill6n, V. Gimeno
Sendra, J. Martin Ostos, E. Pedraz Penalva (who wrote on whether the jury court was necessary at all!),
and A. P6rez-Cruz. For a list of several works by these professors, see Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participa-
tion, supra note 3, at 181-85. Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 3, at 253, considered the mixed court
as the best solution for Spain. For a selection of Spanish as well as Latin-American bibliographies
providing comparative views of jury proceedings in different Spanish-speaking countries, see the
general work JUicio POR JURADOS EN EL PROCESO PENAL (Julio B.J. Maier et al. eds., 2000), with
contributions by Emesto Pedraz Penalva at 239-333 and Agustin-Jes6s P6rez-Cruz at 335-88.
5. LOTJ art. 59(l).
6. LOTJ art. 61(l)(d) (requiring "a succinct explanation of the reasons why the members of the
jury have declared, or refused to declare, certain facts as having been proved" to be one of the contents
of the verdict form). For a comparative view of Spanish and U.S. legislation, see specifically E. VELEZ
RODRIGUEZ, LA MOTIVACION Y RACIONALIDAD DEL VEREDICTO EN EL DERECHO ESPA&OL Y EN EL
DERECHO NORTEAMERICANO (2006).
7. For a general view of the jury in common law countries, see Neil Vidmar, Foreword: The
Common Law Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1999). For specific literature from the U.K. on
classic studies, see, for example, SEAN ENRIGHT & JAMES MORTON, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE
CRIMINAL JURY IN THE 1990S (1990); JAMES GOBERT, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND THE JURY (1997);
HARRIET HARMAN & JOHN GRIFFITH, JUSTICE DESERTED: THE SUBVERSION OF THE JURY (1979); JOHN
JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY (1995). In Spanish, see Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, La
Instituci6n del Jurado en el Reino Unido y el Rfgimen Especial de Irlanda del Norte, 1-3 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PROCESAL 343 (2001). Reference is made to the English jury because different rules and
systems are provided for juries in Scotland. See especially Peter Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury: A
Very Peculiar Institution, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1999).
For a recent discussion of the U.S.A. jury system, see Symposium, The Jury at a Crossroad:
The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907 (2003); NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS
(2005). In Spain for the translation of classic works, see REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY
PENNINGTON, LA INSTITUCI6N DEL JURADO EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS: SUS INTIMIDADES (1986); see
specifically 1. Esparza Leibar, El Jurado en los Estados Unidos de Norteamdrica: Problemdtica Gen-
eral: El Procedimiento de Seleccidn, 1 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL 295 (1995); see also
RODRiGUEZ, supra note 6, at 85-130.
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in the U.S., 8 as the majority rule was introduced in the U.K. some years
ago9-Spanish legislation merely requires the agreement of a majority of
the nine jurors to reach a non-guilty verdict and seven votes for a guilty
verdict. 10 The most controversial question remains the legal requirements
for the reasoning behind the verdict itself. Not only is this disputed by
scholars but, more importantly, it is a thorny problem in judicial practice
and has stirred up numerous jurisprudential conflicts in the Spanish supe-
rior appeal courts that have overturned verdicts and even entire sentences.
I. THE PLOT OF 12 ANGRYMEN
The plot of 12 Angry Men is well known in Spain.' I Almost all of the
one and a half hours or so of action takes place in a single room, except for
some scenes in a washroom and a few scenes at the start and end of the
film that take place in the courtroom itself. A jury of twelve men plays out
the key roles, and the protagonist, the only dissenting member of the jury
who votes in favor of a "non-guilty" verdict in the first vote, is played by
Henry Fonda (Juror #8). He only decides "to talk" after the first vote has
been conducted in accordance with a "verdict-driven" deliberation model; 12
his concern being that a possible death sentence against the young defen-
dant at the very least merits a minimum degree of consideration. Further-
more, he harbors a "reasonable doubt" about the "presumption of guilt,"
something that most members of the jury seem to have taken for granted.
He goes on to assume a leadership position in the group, unlike the foreper-
son, Juror #1, whose role is merely administrative.13
The jury is drawn from a wide spectrum of late-I 950s American soci-
ety (1957). It could hardly be considered a representative group, above all
8. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 48; see also MARDER, supra note 7, at 164-71.
On the role of juries and the juror, particularly in civil proceedings, see, for example, VALERIE P. HANS,
BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
9. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 13 (Eng.).
10. See l. Esparza Leibar, Algunas Cuestiones Sobre el Veredicto en la Ley del Jurado, 4 REVISTA
TRIBUNALES DE JUSTICIA 451 (2000); see also JUICIO POR JURADOS EN EL PROCESO PENAL supra note
4, at 389-98.
11. For specific literature in Spanish, see, for example, BENJAMIN RIVAYA & PABLO DE CIMA,
DERECHO Y CINE EN 100 PELICULAS: UNA GUiA BASICA 199-207 (2004); see also FRANCISCO SOTO
NIETO & FRANCISCO J. FERNANDEZ, IMAGENES Y JUSTICIA: EL DERECHO A TRAVES DEL CINE 59-76
(2004). Also for a comment on 12 Angry Men and jury movies in general, see G6MEZ COLOMER, supra
note ],at 52-55.
12. See Marder, supra note 2, at 159-60. "Verdict-driven" deliberation is opposed to "evidence-
driven" deliberation, two methods of proceeding according to when the voting takes place, either before
or after any discussion. For a more extensive discussion on both styles of deliberation, see MARDER,
supra note 7, at 154-60.
13. See MARDER, supra note 7, at 153.
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nowadays, as all of the jurors are white males sitting in judgment over a
Puerto Rican/Hispanic youth. There are neither women jurors nor jurors
belonging to other ethnic or minority groups, although the jurors do differ
in terms of age, social and educational background, and attitude. As ju-
rors, 14 they all remain anonymous and none of their names are mentioned
until the final scene outside the courthouse, in which the protagonist, Juror
#8-Henry Fonda-gives his name as Davis in reply to Juror #9, who in-
troduces himself as Mr. McCardle. They form a representative cross-
section of society and include a high school sports coach, an entrepreneur,
a bank clerk, a stockbroker, a youth from a deprived slum area, a
painter/manual laborer, a watchmaker, a garage owner, a salesman, an ad-
vertising executive, a retired businessman, and the protagonist, an architect
played by Henry Fonda. Thus, the jury includes various members of the
middle classes, one of whom outshines the rest as the most cultivated
member of the team, in sharp contrast to the rude ignorance demonstrated
by Juror #3 (Lee J. Cobb) and the simplicity and irresponsibility of Juror #7
(Jack Warden).' 5
The atmosphere is very oppressive-hence the title 12 Angry Men-in
the hot jury room. Sidney Lumet, the film's director, is determined to cre-
ate a claustrophobic atmosphere, 16 complicating the task of reaching a
unanimous verdict. Most of the participants appear to express anger at hav-
ing been chosen for jury service and they want to finish quickly; they are
uninterested in fulfilling their duties as jurors, and are in a hurry. This re-
veals one of the great weaknesses of the judicial system: 17 people's indif-
ference to the responsibilities of jury service. This is not the only weakness;
there is also that essential point concerning the institution of the jury itself,
which is the need for the jury to reach a unanimous decision. The film also
deals with other issues: the role of an ex officio defense lawyer, the death
penalty, enforcement of the principles of the presumption of innocence and
14. The only distinction between jurors is made according to the positions at the round table
starting with the foreman, Juror #1. About the jury's composition, it has been said that "[e]ven in the
50s, it would have been unlikely to have an all-male, all-white jury," and also that "it was improper for
Juror #8 to act as a defense attorney" and that "[t]he 'angry' interactions between some of the jurors
seem overly personal and exaggerated." See these and other comments on FilmSite.org, 12 Angry Men
(1957), http://www.filmsite.org/twelve.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
15. See SOTO NIETO & FERNANDEZ, supra note 11, at 64.
16. The director, Sidney Lumet, confessed that he had used this special approach to create a tense
feeling of suffocation present throughout the dialectical confrontation. See RIVAYA & DE CIMA, supra
note 11, at 201.
17. That is the main title for a discussion of this film in SOTO NIETO & FERNANDEZ, supra note
11, at 62.
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in dubio pro reo, and weaknesses in testimonial evidence. 18 The film re-
mains highly relevant given the continued importance of these issues today,
even though it was made fifty years ago and is in some respects out of date
(filmed in black and white, 1950s scenery and dress, and so on).
As a professor of law, I decided to show the film to undergraduate
students in 2005 and 2006 at Burgos University School of Law (Spain) as
part of an optional subject entitled Law and Cinema. Although the students
initially had mixed reactions of surprise and even disinterest, as they
viewed the film 19 they become more engrossed and they thoroughly en-
joyed the way it ended, which was reflected in their written work. Indeed,
the film has been placed on their list of all-time favorites. They were only
required to submit one essay for assessment, 20 and out of a lengthy list
containing many other modem films, many of the students chose to write
about this one, which proved their interest in the film. In addition to the
excellent performances of its characters, they particularly enjoyed its script.
The plot is a wonderful excuse for introducing a classroom discussion on
the trial-by-jury system as opposed to the system of mixed courts that are
more frequent in the Spanish judicial system.
The students showed less enthusiasm for the jury system in Spain. I
am not only referring to the opinions that they expressed after having
viewed the film, during an informal discussion, but also to the points of
view they conveyed in their essays. They appeared to be rather critical of
the nature of the trial by jury system currently in place in Spain. 21 It should
also be stated that their views are not at all atypical but are representative
of public opinion in general in Spain, where there is reluctance to express
confidence in lay participation in the judicial system. This may be due to
18. Such overvaluation of testimony, as opposed to the undervaluation of documentary evidence,
is also well known in Spanish judicial practice.
19. This is one of the oldest movies on the viewing list of the Law and Cinema study module at
Burgos School of Law, and the only black and white film. Interesting to note that most of the twenty-
year-old students had never before watched a black-and-white movie.
20. The official list of the fifteen films is available at http://www.ubu.es/inforalumno/academica/
proglibreasi.htm (number 4987).
21. Almost all the students expressed a hypothetical preference for a professional judge instead of
a jury if they were ever brought to court one day, and the mixed court model was only considered
acceptable where necessary. Other forms of lay participation were considered acceptable in the admini-
stration of justice, such as the popular action provided for under Article 125 of the Spanish Constitu-
tion. See Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participation, supra note 3, at 164-65; see also Julio Prez Gil, Private
Interests Seeking Punishment: Prosecution Brought by Private Individuals and Groups in Spain, 25
LAW & POL'Y 151 (2003).
Article 125 of the Spanish Constitution states, "Citizens may engage in popular action and
take part in the administration of justice through the institution of the jury, in the manner and with
respect to those criminal trials as may be determined by law, as well as in customary and tradition
alcourts." An English translation is available at http://www.constitucion.es/constitucion/lenguas/ in-
gles.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2007.
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negative opinions towards past and present judicial practice (e.g., the
"scandalous" acquittal in the Otegi case, 22 and the retrial ordered in the
controversial Wanninkhof case, following the quashing of Dolores
Vdzquez's wrongful conviction in first trial). 23 Let us now turn our atten-
tion to jury deliberations in Spain and to the provisions of Spanish legisla-
tion with respect to jury verdicts, which is where jury rules in Spain differ
markedly from those in the Anglo-Saxon system.
22. Mikel Mirena Otegi Unanue was acquitted of the murder and attempted murder of two Basque
policemen under the exemption of "temporary mental disorder" after a jury trial held in the Basque
Country. Following an appeals procedure, the Supreme Court of the Basque Country, on December 9,
1997, overturned both the verdict and the sentence pronounced by the magistrate-president of Gipuzkoa
on March 10, 1997 and ordered a retrial. The decision was upheld on March 12, 1998, STS Mar. 12,
1998 (R.J., No. 2355), when the Supreme Court rejected the defense appeal, and upheld again on De-
cember 20, 2004, in Constitutional Court ruling STC 246/2004. Nevertheless, a retrial was not possible
because the defendant escaped and Spanish criminal legislation requires as a general rule the presence
of the accused in criminal proceedings, except when the penalty is less than two years of imprisonment.
Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal [Spanish Criminal Procedural Law] art. 786(1) [hereinafter LECrim].
This acquittal was highly criticized as it was thought that the jury pronounced its verdict out of fear of
possible reprisals by the Basque terrorist group ETA with which the accused supposedly had ties.
Contrary opinions were also expressed, for example, by the defense lawyer Miguel Castells. See E.
FOREST 6,PROCESO AL JURADO? CONVERSACIONES CON MIGUEL CASTELLS (1997); Juan lgartfia
Salaverria, El Jurado y la Motivacidn de su Veredicto: A Propdsito de la STC Sobre el "Caso Otegi, "
51 REVISTA VASCA DE ADMINISTRACi6N PUBLICA 215 (1998). In English, see Thaman, Europe's New
Jury Systems, supra note 3, at 255; Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 3, at 405-11 (also discussing
other judicial practices in jury courts on subsequent pages).
23. Rocio Wanninkhof, a nineteen-year-old girl, was assassinated in the province of Milaga on
October 19, 1999. Dolores Vdzquez, a friend of the victim's mother, was declared guilty by seven
favorable votes against two non-favorable votes, satisfying the majority rule required under Spanish
legislation. The verdict as well as the sentence pronounced by the Provincial Court of Mdlaga on Sep-
tember 25, 2001, were overturned after an appeal to the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Andalucia
(Supreme Court of Andalusia) on February 1, 2002 on the grounds of "lack of reasoning" in the verdict
as required in Article 61(l)(d) of the LOTJ; a retrial was ordered with a new jury. This pronouncement
was ratified on appeal by the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) on March 12, 2003, which upheld the
previous decision for a retrial. STS, Mar. 12, 2003 (R.J. No. 2576). During this time, the accused,
Dolores Vdzquez, had spent seventeen months in custody.
But the most extraordinary aspect of this case came after a DNA test presented as evidence in
a separate murder case led to the sentencing of Tony King for the murder that took place in Coin
(Milaga) of a young girl named Sonia Carabantes. In the second Wanninkhof trial, recently concluded
in December 2006, the verdict of the jury, pronounced on December 13, was unanimous in declaring
Tony King guilty of the murder of Rocio Wanninkhof. For numerous articles regarding the case in the
Spanish press around this time, see El Pais, http://www.elpais.com (search for "Wanninkhof') (last
visited Aug. 24, 2007). More extensive references can be found in the literature on this case. See, e.g., J.
Igartita Salaverria, El caso Wanninkhof" JTiro de gracia aljurado?, 50 JUECES PARA LA DEMOCRACIA
63 (2004) (arguing that responsibility for this judicial mistake lay with the magistrate-president of the
jury court). Also, some comments are addressed by C. Sanchis Crespo, El Jurado y la Presuncidn de
Inocencia: A Propdsito de la Pelicula "Veredicto final," 25 ESTADOS PENALES Y CRIMINOLOGICOS
311, 325-29 (2005) (questioning the credibility of the jury institution itself, its main theme being the
Spanish version of a "Final verdict" (Veredictofinal)).
Precisely, because of the great debate sustained after such a case putting in evidence the
credibility of the jury institution, the Pro-Jury Association made a public declaration regarding the
Wanninkhof case through its president, Miguel Cid Cebri~n, on behalf of jury trials. See Miguel Cid
Cebri~n, Press Release, Nota Sobre el "Caso Wanninkhof" de la Asociacion Pro-Jurado (Sept. 23,
2003), available at http://www.estudiojuridicomiguelcid.com.
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II. THE VERDICT IN SPAIN
Without doubt, the Spanish system is distinguished by the legal re-
quirements that relate to the adoption of the verdict. Two of the main points
are the majority rule and the need for the jury to give its reasoning or "ex-
planations" for returning a "guilty" or a "not-guilty" verdict. Had these two
points been applicable to the plot of the film, a very different story line
would have ensued. There would, in effect, have been no plot at all, as the
film would have ended after the first vote with the majority of the jurors in
favor of a "guilty" verdict, leaving the defendant to face the death penalty.
In order to demonstrate that the plot of the film could not be applied to the
trial-by-jury system in Spain, 24 these two requirements are detailed below.
A. The Rule of the Majority
Under the Jury Law in Spain, five votes are required to prove a fact as
"favorable" to the accused but seven are required to prove a fact as "unfa-
vorable. '25 Unlike the initial and general guilty or not-guilty verdict that
establishes the culpability of the accused in the traditional Anglo-Saxon
system, Spanish law requires, in the first instance, that the jury deliberate
on each particular item on the verdict form or, more exactly, on the "object
of the verdict" for which legal provisions are also made. 26 The form is
given to the jury with the judge's habitual "directions to the jury" and
"summing up"27 at the end of a jury trial. Thus, deliberation in the Spanish
24. References to inefficiency are of course only made in relation to the diversity of rules sur-
rounding the Spanish jury and verdicts and not in relation to the film itself, which remains an excellent
portrayal ofjury deliberations.
25. LOTJ art. 59(1).
26. See Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participation, supra note 3, at 178; Thaman, Spain Returns, supra
note 3, at 321-23. Article 52(1) of the LOTJ stipulates that this written verdict form must be reviewed
by the judge (magistrate-president of the jury court) and he or she must narrate "in separate, numbered
paragraphs the facts alleged by the parties, which the jury should declare to be proved or not, differenti-
ating between those which are against the defendant, and those which are favorable." Id. at 322 (provid-
ing the English translation). In Spanish literature on this point, see J.M. BERMODEZ REQUENA, EL
OBJETO DEL VEREDICTO EN LA LEY DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO (2004); see also D. de Alfonso Laso,
La Determinaci6n del Objeto del Veredicto: Problemas Practices y Reales que se Pueden Llegar a
Plantear, in LA LEY PENAL 27-44, 111-120 (2005) (giving practical examples and including other
examples of verdict forms).
27. See Jimeno Bulnes, supra note 7, at 373-77. Articles 54(1) and (2) of the LOTJ stipulate that
the magistrate-president of the jury court will hand over the verdict form to the jury and at the same
time, "will instruct them on the contents of the duties conferred on them, the rules that govern their
deliberation and voting and the way in which they should reflect their verdict" as well as "the nature of
the facts under discussion, which determine the circumstances constitutive of the crime with which the
defendants have been charged, and those which refer to allegations of exclusion or modification of
guilt." First translation by the author and second translation from Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 3,
at 353. In the Spanish literature, see MARiA-ANGELES PEREZ CEBADERA, LAS INSTRUCCIONES AL
JURADO (2003) (providing a comparative view of the North American system). Also from another point
2007]
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system starts with an itemized vote on a list of "sequentially articulated
propositions," unlike the "simple guilty/not-guilty" Anglo-Saxon verdict 28
that is provided for in other common law legislations, and does not even
require a unanimous verdict.29 Afterwards, the jury votes for a second time
on the culpability or non-culpability of the defendant for every offense and,
once again, the majority rule is applied.30 It has been suggested that this
verdict with "two-steps" or "echelons" should be applied to U.S. juries. 31
It should be noted that the jury court in Spain is composed of nine
citizens 32 (with two alternate jurors) and is headed by a magistrate belong-
ing to the Criminal Section of the Provincial Court: jurors provide the ver-
dict and the magistrate-president, having reviewed the verdict, pronounces
sentence and imposes the punishment.33 Naturally, secrecy of deliberation
of view, see J.M. de Pail Velasco, Instrucciones al Jurado: Observaciones Practices con Alguna
Icursidn Tedrica, in CONSEJO GENERAL DEL PODER JUDICIAL [SPANISH GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE
JUDICIARY BRANCH OR C.G.P.G.] PROBLEMAS DEL JUICIO ORAL CON JURADO 203 (1995). For a more
recent, general view on future proposals, see Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the
Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449 (2006).
28. According to Article 52(1) of the LOTJ the issues that must be addressed for each crime and
each defendant are as follows:
(1) the facts which prove the commission of the crime (corpus delicti) and the defendant's
identity as the perpetrator; (2) the defense allegations; (3) the facts which could completely
justify or excuse the charged criminal acts; (4) a narrative of the facts that determine the de-
gree of execution or participation in the offense, or any statutory aggravating or mitigating
circumstances; and (5) the criminal act as to which the defendant must be declared guilty or
not guilty ....
Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 3, at 322.
29. For example, in the U.K., the Juries Act 1974, c. 23, § 17(1), for England and Wales states
"the verdict of a jury in the Crown Court or the High Court need not be unanimous if: (a) in a case
where there are no less than eleven jurors, ten of whom agree on the verdict; and (b) in a case where
there are ten jurors, nine of whom agree on the verdict." Thus, a qualified majority rle of sorts is
allowed. See Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 7, at 379-81 (providing a bibliography and examples). Also,
the majority rule is provided for in Scottish criminal juries according to the Jurors Act 1825; in this
case, a simple majority requires eight votes in a fifteen-person jury. But certainly the most peculiar
aspect of Scottish jury law is the choice of three possible verdicts, i) guilty, ii) not proven, and iii) not
guilty. However, the "not-proven" verdict counts as much as an acquittal as does a not-guilty verdict,
the difference being that it is not a positive declaration of innocence but simply implies that the guilt of
the accused has not been conclusively demonstrated. See Duff, supra note 7, at 190-97.
30. Again, seven votes are required to prove the culpability and just five votes for the non-
culpability of the accused. LOTJ art. 60(2); see J. L6pez Sdnchez, El Veredicto de Culpabilidad del
Jurado, 12 REVISTA TRIBUNALES DE JUSTICIA 1159 (1999). See generally A. Lorca Navarrete, La
Deliberaci6n del Jurado en la Declaracidn del Hecho Probado y Proclanaci6n de la Culpabilidad o
Inculpabilidad del Acusado en la Doctrina y en la Reciente Jurisprudencia, DIARIO LA LEY, Mar. 11,
2003, at 1.
31. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LAS ViCTIMAS ANTE EL JURADO 246-56 (1997).
32. LOTJ art. 2(1). However, previous legal precedents exist in Spain, especially that of the Jury
Law of 1888, confirmed on April 20, 1888 (known as the "Pacheco Law"), which provided for a jury
panel of twelve jurors presided over by three professional judges. The latter was influenced by the
French as a first step towards a mixed court or escabinado model that was to appear at a later date. The
verdict at that time was one of guilty or not guilty.
33. LOTJ arts. 2-4. The LOTJ establishes this lay participation of citizens as jurors as both a
"duty" and a "right," in a very particular way, as explained in Article 6 of the LOTJ. Inasmuch as it is a
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is a strict requirement 34 and the voting is carried out orally in alphabetical
order. The foreperson (the first name on the jury list) votes last of all, and
all jurors who choose to abstain are fined.35 Specifically, the Preamble to
the LOTJ explains why the unanimity rule is not chosen for the verdict,
stating that even though it would appear to be "the most appropriate
method of obliging jurors to perform the most thorough deliberation" it is
not adopted to avoid the breakdown of the deliberation process itself (hung
juries). 36 The majority-rule option is therefore preferred, as it is likely to
counteract excessive dissolutions of the jury,37 unless in enforcement of the
Jury Law. As far as I have been able to ascertain, no proposed amendments
have been submitted on this point, although they have been submitted on
other points (particularly, the authority to modify the list of offenses which
entail a right to a jury trial). 38
right, the law guarantees a remuneration: the Resolution of September 21, 2006, of the Sub-Secretary of
the Ministry of the Presidency determines a daily payment of 67 E to every juror and 33.50 E to pro-
spective jurors as well as compensation for travel (0.19 E/km by car), lodging (65.97 E, breakfast in-
cluded), and 18.70 E maintenance expenses (lunch and evening meal). More comments on juror tasks
and jury selection are included in Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participation, supra note 3, at 173, 177.
34. According to Article 56 of the LOTJ a jury will remain "in a closed session" until a verdict is
reached; logically, if deliberations take a long time and the jury needs rest, recess should be arranged by
the magistrate-president through jury sequestration. Also, meals and accommodation are arranged if
necessary in restaurants and hotels that are provided for by the justice administration.
35. LOTJ art. 58. Legal fines amount to 450.76 E. If abstention persists, it will be counted as a
favorable vote to the accused.
36. LOTJ pmbl., pt.V (covering the verdict and deliberation and voting); see also MARDER, supra
note 7, at 172 (defining a hung jury).
37. Of course, the LOTJ contemplates the dismissal of the jury if the verdict does not reach the
number of legally required votes, which forces a retrial with a new jury. LOTJ art. 65. Another possibil-
ity is the advance dismissal of the jury at the request of counsel, when either counsel or the magistrate-
president considers that there is insufficient evidence, LOTJ art. 49, or when the accused reaches an
agreement, LOTJ art. 50, similar to plea-bargaining in the U.S. to plead guilty to a particular charge.
38. For example, the exclusion of "bagatelle/trash offenses"-e.g., threats or trespass of a dwell-
ing-as well as the introduction of other more socially relevant offenses-e.g., sex crimes and unlawful
deprivation of liberty-despite the intentional exclusion of the former from the final draft of the jury
law because of the excessive social sensitivity that these offenses cause. See Jesats Maria Gonzdlez
Garcia, Constitucidn de 1978 y Justicia Popular: Siete Ahos de Tribunal de Jurado, in LA
CONSTITUCION ESPAftOLA DE 1978 EN SU XXV ANIVERSARIO 933-40 (Centro de Estudios Politicos
eds., 2003); Gustavo Lrpez-Mufioz y Larraz, Don Quixote y Sancho en el Jurado: La Reforma, 17
REVISTA VASCA DE DERECHO PROCESAL Y ARBITRAJE 41, 59-62 (2005), available at
http://www.pacientes.org/quixote.htm. Gustavo Lrpez-Mufioz y Larraz is one of the most courageous
supporters of the jury in Spain and was the first President of the Pro-Jury Association for several years
from 1982 until the reestablishment of the institution in Spain in 1995. His personal web page is avail-
able at Bufete del Letrado Dr. Gustavo Lrpez-Mufioz y Larraz, http://www.jurylaw.net (last visited
Aug. 24, 2007). For a more extensive discussion on the future of the jury, see Gonzalo Quintero Oli-
vares, El Tribunal del Jurado y sus Competencies: Perspectivas de Futuro, in JOst ANTONIO MARTIN
PALLiN ET AL., LA LEY DEL JURADO EN SU X ANIVERSARIO 41 (2006).
A proposal to amend the authority of jury courts was suggested by the Office of the General
Attorney in 2001. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2005, at 659
(Madrid 2006). Other proposed amendments include, for example, the extension of criminal responsi-
bility for jurors and the drafting of a specific offense applicable to jurors insofar as they act as judges,
or pervert the course of justice. See MARTiN PALLiN ET AL., supra, at 17, 22 (the author was a magis-
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Thus, Spain along with other countries, such as the U.K. since 1967, is
in favor of the majority rule for reasons of "efficiency. '39 In contrast, to
facilitate the deliberation process, U.S. rules have created smaller juries for
certain federal or state courts (six or eight jurors rather than twelve), espe-
cially in civil cases; the verdict still has to be unanimous, at least in federal
courts, although a number of state courts also apply the majority rule to
civil proceedings.40 These changes in the United States, especially the re-
duction in the size of the jury, constitutionally accepted in Williams v. Flor-
ida,4 1 gave rise to major debates during the 1970s between supporters of
both the twelve-person jury42 and the six-person jury,43 who argued vigor-
ously in favor of and against both options. Examples of the arguments pro-
posed by both sides are the need for a more balanced representation of the
community on the panel set against the need for a shorter jury deliberation
time. 44 It is clear that the amendments relating to a smaller jury size and the
watering down of the unanimity requirement were adopted to counter the
complexity of jury deliberations, 45 and support the preference of the Span-
ish legislature for a nine-person jury and the majority verdict.
trate of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, until he retired in 2007); see also F.J. Alvarez Garcia &
F.M. Pereira Gonzalez, La Prevaricaci6n Judicial y el Tribunal del Jurado, DIARIO LA LEY, Feb. 16,
2006, at 1. See generally ANTONi LLABRtS FUSTER & CARMEN TOMAS-VALIENTE LANUZA, LA
RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL DEL MIEMBRO DEL JURADO (1998).
39. See supra note 9.
40. See MARDER, supra note 7, at 166-67.
41. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). A list of different U.S. states with twelve-person, eight-person, and six-
person juries was compiled by R. Arce & J. Sobral, Tamaho del Jurado y Regla Resolutoria, in LA
PSICOLOGiA SOCIAL EN LA SALA DE JUSTICIA 49, 54-55 (R. Arce & J Sobral eds., 1990). On the rela-
tion the between number of jurors and functioning of the jury in its deliberations, see HASTIE, PENROD
& PENNINGTON, supra note 7, at 64-71.
42. See, e.g., Hans Zeisel, Twelve Is Just, TRIAL MAG., Nov.-Dec., 1974, at 13.
43. See, e.g., Edward Thompson, Six Will Do!, TRIAL MAG., Nov.-Dec., 1974, at 12.
44. Sometimes a minimum term of deliberation is even required, e.g., in U.K. Practice Direction
of May 11, 1970, issued by Judge Parker, Court of Appeal, Criminal Division (Lord Chief of Justice).
In the future any verdict of a majority of a jury shall not be accepted until two hours and 10
minutes have elapsed between the time when the last member of the jury has left the jury box
to go to the jury room and the time when there is put to the jury the first of the questions set
out in paragraph 3 of the Practice Direction 51 Cr.App.R.
Such paragraph 3 of the previous Practice Direction of July 31, 1967, contains a questionnaire form that
the judge will address to the jury in order to verify if the verdict has been adopted unanimously or by a
majority. For the current rules regarding this issue, see Ministry of Justice, Consolidated Criminal
Practice Direction § IV.46, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/criminal/procrulesfin/contents/
practice-direction/pd_consolidated.htm.
45. See, e.g., GOBERT, supra note 7, at 90-92 (talking about the "dialectics of deliberation"); R.
Arce, J. Sobral & F. Farifia, Antilisis de la Deliberaci6n del Jurado, in LA PSICOLOGiA SOCIAL EN LA
SALA DE JUSTICIA, supra note 41, at 77 (arguing that most studies of jury decision-making processes
concentrate on the time factor).
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Finally, a few statistics should be given here regarding the number of
convictions and acquittals in Spanish jury courts over 2004 and 2005:46 a
total of 351 conviction sentences, set against a mere 50 acquittal sentences,
gives a figure of 87.53% of all jury trials in favor of conviction in 2004.
This proportion increased slightly in 2005: 278 conviction sentences, and
27 acquittal sentences, gave a percentage of 91.15%, once again favorable
to conviction. Surprisingly perhaps, it cannot be assumed that Spanish ju-
ries will be more lenient than professional judges, despite the bitter experi-
ence of "scandalous acquittals" such as the Otegi case, 47 even though a
rationale for those verdicts is required by law.
B. The Requirement for a "Reasoned" Verdict
Certainly, the most noteworthy aspect of the Spanish system is the re-
quirement that a reasoned explanation be provided for the verdict, which
might astonish anyone familiar with traditional jury systems. 48 A quintes-
sential element of the classic Anglo-Saxon jury system is precisely the
absence of any kind of explanation; the verdict is by nature spontaneous. 49
It appears that there is at least one legal precedent in comparative law,
which is found in section 331(e) of the Austrian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which allows the jury to write down the reasons for its verdict.50 The
requirement in the LOTJ that the verdict be reasoned is derived from con-
stitutional rules, especially that which refers to the grounds of the judgment
as set down in Article 120(3) of the Spanish Constitution. 51
46. See Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Memoria Annual 2006, available at
http://www.podejudicial.es/eversuite/GetRecords?Template=cgpj/cgpj/pjexaminarmemoria.html&Tabl
eName=PJMEMORIAS&dkey-25.
47. See supra note 22.
48. LOTJart. 61(l)(d).
49. For this reason, the predictability of the verdict is studied from a sociological and a psycho-
logical point of view. See, e.g., HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 7, at 114-32.
50. § 331(e) StPO (Aus.); see also Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 3, at 364 & n.556; Thaman,
Europe's New Jury Systems, supra note 3, at 254.
51. Textually, "Judgments shall always specify the grounds therefore, and they shall be delivered
in a public hearing." C.E. art. 120(3). The same arguments have been employed with respect to Article
24 in provision of effective judicial protection and due process of law, insofar as constitutional juris-
prudence recognizes the right to obtain a "well-founded judgment"; or, more specifically, even as
regards the right of being presumed innocent until proven guilty as prescribed in Article 24(2) and
interpreted by the Constitutional Court as requiring "reasoned" evidence to be presented. This last
argument advanced by Vincente Gimeno Sendra is found in several works. See, e.g., Vincente Gimeno
Sendra, La segunda reforma urgente de la Lev del Jurado, 39 REVISTA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 419, 427
(1995). The argument for the presumption of innocence in relation to the jury is also explored in San-
chis Crespo, supra note 23. In relation to this point, see, for example, J.M. Bermtudez Requena, La
sentencia del Tribunal del Jurado, in DCIMO ANIVERSARIO DE LA LEY DEL JURADO 11, 24 (2006);
J.M. Garcia Moreno, La motivacifn del veredicto deljurado popular, 2 REVISTA DE JURISPRUDENCIA
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Specifically, Article 61(l)(d) of the LOTJ stipulates that the verdict
shall include "a succinct explanation of the reasons why they [the members
of the jury] have declared, or refused to declare, certain facts as having
been proved. '52 The main issue relates to whether the verdict form satisfies
the requirement of providing a "succinct explanation of the reasons. '53
Judicial practice endeavors to resolve this issue on a case-by-case basis
through the Supreme Court appeals procedures, as part of the judicial re-
view of judgments pronounced in the Regional Supreme Courts, 54 and
subsequently, if a defense appeal is promoted due to an alleged violation of
constitutional rights (in this case, the right to effective judicial protection
guaranteed under Article 24(l)),55 through the Constitutional Court.
From a general standpoint, and in accordance with the interpretation
provided by the Supreme Court, there are three alternative theses by which
the suitability of the reasoning in jury verdicts may be assessed. 56 These
positions vary from the strictest interpretation (the "maximalist thesis") that
requires a thorough description of the whole deliberation process and that
concludes with a declaration that certain facts have or have not been
proven, to the most flexible interpretation (the "minimalist thesis"), which
permits general references to the evidence with no greater detail. The in-
termediate position preferred by the Supreme Court57 would appear to be
EL DERECHO 1 (2006). In relation to the presumption of innocence and the principle in dubio pro reo,
see VtLEZ RODRIGUEZ, supra note 6, at 195-202.
52. Translation taken from Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 3, at 364.
53. See interpretation provided by A.M. Lorca Navarrete, La motivacidn del veredicto en la
doctrina y en la reciente jurisprudencia: En concreto la denominada 'duda razonable,' DIARIO LA
LEY, Jan. 27, 2003, at 1; see also A.M. LORCA NAVARRETE, EL JURADO: EXPERIENCIAS Y FUTURO EN
EL DECIMO ANIVERSARIO DE LA LEY DEL JURADO (1995-2005): LA PRACTICA ADVERSARIAL DEL
PROCESO PENAL ORDINARIO DE LA LEY DEL JURADO EN LA MAS RECIENTE TEORiA Y JURISPRUDENCIA
674-72 (2005).
54. LECrim. arts. 847-48; see also JUAN MONTERO AROCA, LOS RECURSOS EN EL PROCESO ANTE
EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 165-79 (1996).
55. Textually, Article 24(1) of the Spanish Constitution states that "[a]ll persons have the right to
obtain effective protection from the judges and the courts in the exercise of their rights and legitimate
interests, and in no case may there be a lack of defense." Provision for defense appeals or individual
appeals is made for "citizens" (although extensive interpretation by the Constitutional Court has recog-
nized this right as applied to foreigners) under Article 53(2) of the Spanish Constitution. Appeals may
be made on the basis of any infringement of rights contained in Articles 14-29, except for the right of
conscientious objection in Article 30(2).
56. See STS, July 7, 2005 (R.J. No. 894); see also Garcia Moreno, supra note 51, at 2. Also, an
extensive review of judicial practice by the Supreme Court is contemplated in J. Vegas Torres, La
motivacidn del veredicto en lajurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo, in MARTiN PALLIN ET AL., supra
note 38, at 85. See generally J. CANO BARRERO, LA LEY DEL JURADO: JURISPRUDENCIA COMENTADA
(DIEZ ANOS DE LA APLICACION DE LA LEY DEL JURADO) 122-61 (2007).
57. See, e.g., STS, June 13, 2005 (R.J. No. 6007); STS, Sept. 13, 2005 (R.J. No. 8658); STS, Oct.
18, 2005 (R.J. No. 7659); STS, Nov. 16, 2006 (R.J. No. 116). Despite accepting this type of verdict, at
times the Supreme Court has declared that it can be improved. See, e.g., STS, June 1, 2005 (R.J. No.
5892). In other cases, the Supreme Court argues the minimalist position, declaring that only cursory
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the most appropriate, which supports an itemized specification of all points
relevant to the evidence without requiring the accuracy of judicial reason-
ing (which in any case is provided afterwards by the magistrate-president
when pronouncing sentence). In this context it must be remembered that
the jurors are simply lay assessors and not professional judges. Judicial
experience shows that an explanation of why facts are considered proven
must be accurate when based on circumstantial evidence as opposed to
direct evidence 58 and when they lead to a conviction rather than an acquit-
tal. 59
These same conclusions have been supported by the Constitutional
Court when distinguishing between the verdict and the sentence. This is the
case, for example, in STC 169/2004, of October 6, 2004, and STC
246/2004, of December 20, 2004, the former in denial of the defense appeal
presented by Mikel Otegi because "none of the 91 facts-both favorable
and not favorable to the accused-listed on the verdict form were summa-
rily explained," and only a very general mention was made of the evidence
as a whole. 60 The first ruling distinguishes between conviction and acquit-
reference to the evidence presented at the trial is necessary because of the principle of immediacy and
where the authorship is "obvious." See, e.g., STS, Apr. 8, 2005 (R.J. No. 4975).
The same tendency is noted in Provincial Courts drafting their respective sentences based on
verdicts; for example, the judgment by the Provincial Court of Gipuzcoa, Mar. 29, 2005 (J.U.R. No.
192947), arguing in favor of a reasonable guilty verdict.
58. For example, STS, Apr. 8, 2005 (R.J. No. 4975), of the Supreme Court in which the documen-
tary evidence was the weapon employed to commit the assassination that was presented at the trial as
well as the scientific evidence that death was caused by the same weapon (a jackknife). In contrast, in
STS, Feb. 16, 2005 (R.J. No. 4759), the only evidence was circumstantial insofar as it consisted of a
declaration by a witness, which was not considered by the jury in the explanation of the verdict. Be-
cause the witness's declaration was not considered, the verdict was overturned by the Regional Su-
preme Court of Andalucia (Granada), as was the sentence pronounced by the magistrate-president,
which is at present subject to appeal proceedings, the Supreme Court having dismissed the appeal on
similar grounds. A further example is STS, Feb. 24, 2005 (R.J. No. 2719), in which both the Regional
and the Supreme Court considered the reasoning to be sufficient that resulted in a guilty verdict based
on circumstantial evidence. For more specific information, see Vegas Torres, supra note 56, at 100-10;
see also CANO BARRERO, supra note 56, at 156-59.
59. This argument clearly differentiates between conviction and acquittal, and permits differing
approaches to the requirement for a reasoned verdict, employed, for example, by the Supreme Court in
STS, Feb. 23, 2005 (R.J. No. 7469). In this case, reasonable doubts were found concerning the alleged
facts in the accusation and for that reason the presumption of innocence was not undermined. Another
example is the above-mentioned STS, Sept. 13, 2005 (R.J. No. 8658). The same argument is employed
by the Regional Supreme Court of Castilla y Le6n (Burgos) in the judgments of Oct. 20, 2005 (A.R.P.
No. 706), and Feb. 13, 2005 (J.U.R. 105372), in which appeals against acquittals based on a not-guilty
verdict were rejected.
60. See Dec. 20, 2004 (S.T.C. No. 246). A database of Spanish constitutional jurisprudence is
available at Tribunal Constitucional, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/jurisprudencia/ jurispruden-
cia.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2007). Both judgments have provoked several comments, especially the
last one. See G. Serrano Hoyo, Motivaci6n del veredicto y tutela judicial efectiva en la sentencia del
Tribunal Constitucional (Pleno) 169/2004, de 6 de octubre, I RECOPILAcI6N TRIBUNAL CONSTI-
TUCIONAL 13 (2005). In relation to both constitutional decisions, see Y. Doig Diaz, Sabre la motivaci6n
del veredicto del Jurado, 16 LA LEY PENAL 88 (2005); J. Pavia Cardell, El deber de motivaci6n del
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tal cases, considering that a lesser degree of reasoning is required in acquit-
tal cases, not only with regard to the verdict but also with regard to the
sentence. Such a constitutional precedent is also followed by subsequent
jurisprudence, such as STC 192/2005, of July 18, 2005, and STC 115/2006,
of April 24, 2006, which were also hotly debated as shown by the fact that
dissenting opinions are present in both cases. 61
This issue has important practical consequences because an unrea-
soned or inadequately reasoned verdict can be challenged twice. First, it
can be reversed by the magistrate-president of the jury,62 and second, an
appeal may be made to the Regional Supreme Court against a sentence
based on such a verdict 63 that, if upheld, will force the Court to overturn
the whole sentence. Thus, the "appeal" is against the sentence and not
against the verdict itself,64 and, if it is found that the verdict is adequately
reasoned, nullification will not necessarily imply a new trial with another
jury and magistrate-president. A new trial is ordered, however, whenever a
failure by the jury to observe due process as stipulated in Article 63(l)(e)
of the LOTJ 65 results in the verdict being rejected three times by the Magis-
trate-President. 66
The thorny issue of the rationale supporting the verdict has led schol-
ars to advance arguments both for and against this requirement. 67 Leaving
vaci6n del veredicto del jurado (Comentario a las Sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional,
n~m.169/2004, de 6 de octubre, y ndm.246/2004, de 20 de diciembre), 14 LA LEY PENAL 94 (2005).
61. In STC 192/2005, a dissenting opinion is formulated by M.E. Casas Baamonde, who was at
the time the president of the Constitutional Court. For comments on that opinion, see J. Igarttia Salaver-
ria, Un err6neo reflejo de la presunci6n de inocencia en los veredictos de inculpabilidad y en las
sentencias absolutorias, DIARIO LA LEY, Feb. 7, 2006, at 1. In the second case, STC 115/2006, the
dissenting opinion of Judge Eugeni Gay Montalvo argued in favor of ample reasoning of a verdict, even
if it resulted in an acquittal sentence.
62. LOTJ art. 63(I)(e).
63. LECrim. art. 846 bis c(a); see M.L. Garcia Torres, El control judicial de los defectos del
veredicto, 3 TRIBUNALES DE JUSTICIA 65 (2003).
64. See, for example, over recent years, STS, Feb. 25, 2005 (R.J. No. 2032); STS, Mar. 7, 2006
(R.J. No. 1984); STS, Apr. 20, 2005 (R.J. No. 6798). It is hardly an ordinary appeal because the facts
are in no way challenged; despite its name, it resembles an extraordinary appeal. See Coral Arangiiena
Fanego, El recurso de apelaci6n contra sentencias en los procesos ante el Tribunal del Jurado, 47
REVISTA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 207 (1997); Jos6 Garberi Llobregat, El nuevo recursod de apelaci6n de
la Ley Orgcnica del Tribunald el Jurado, 8 REVISTA VASCA DE DERECHO PROCESAL Y ARBITRAJE 179
(1996); see also MARCO VILLAGOMEZ CEBRIAN, LA 'APELACION' DE LA SENTENCIA EN EL JUICIO CON
JURADO: ESTUDIO DEL RECURSO ESTABLECIDO POR LA L.O. 5/1995 DEL TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA (1998).
65. See recent jurisprudence such as STS, Feb. 3, 2006 (R.J. No. 1929), and STS, Feb. 15, 2006
(R.J. No. 2274).
66. LOTJ art. 65.
67. For example, the answers to the questionnaire promoted by the Center of Juridical Studies
attached to the Ministry of Justice reflected the positions of the two camps for and against the "rea-
soned" jury verdict in Spain. Respuestas a la encuesta, in MARTiN PALLIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 117,
144-63. A very critical opinion is upheld by Manuel Lozano-Higuero Pinto, Sobre algunos vicios,
remediables, del sistema espafiol deljurado (de la hipermotivaci6n a la minoraci6n de la presunci6n de
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aside the extensive doctrinal debate, it could be argued that the constitu-
tional rule prescribed by Article 120(3) refers solely to the sentence in
terms of a judicial decision 68 and not to the verdict given by lay persons.
The Spanish legislature could have opted for the mixed court model as
discussed in recent years.69 Furthermore, Spanish jurisprudence has experi-
enced serious problems when applying the LOTJ in relation to this re-
quirement on several occasions, which has led to the suggestion that it be
abolished. 70 According to statistics, more than fifty percent of all verdicts
are improperly or inadequately reasoned. 71
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Having read through this description of the key attributes of the ver-
dict and the jury system in Spain, the reader will understand why the plot of
the film 12 Angry Men would have been completely different had it been
set in the legal context of the LOTJ and Spain in 1995. The same delibera-
tions as in the film could never have taken place, and Henry Fonda (Juror
#8) would not have put in a performance that deserved an Oscar, despite
never being nominated for one at the time. As argued by many people, 72
the film underlines that the unanimity rule leads to a more thorough debate
than that which occurs in courtrooms where the majority rule applies. In-
deed, in the latter case, there may be no discussion whatsoever if there is a
majority at the outset. Thus, the unusual requirement under Spanish legisla-
inocencia, pasando por el regimen 'sui g~neris' de impugnaciones), in DtCIMO ANIVERSARIO DE LA
LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 51, at 116.
68. See Ernesto Pedraz Penalva, Motivacirn y control de las resoluciones jurisdiccionales, 4
REVISTA DE CIENCIAS JURiDICAS (EL SALVADOR) 31, 59-78 (1992). The same opinion is maintained by
Juan Montero Aroca in his participation during the final discussion that took place in the session of
December 13, 2005, in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Jury Law organized by the
Center of Juridical Studies. Didlogos Juridicos, LA LEY DEL JURADO EN SU X ANIVERSARIO, supra note
38, at 189, 235.
69. This was also one of the clauses implicitly contained in the State Agreement to Reform Justice
(Pacto de Estado para la reforma de la Justicia) signed on May 28, 2001, between the main political
groups in Spain, Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol (PSOE). Clause 17(i)
contemplates the "retraining" of the jury system in accordance with the experiences and observations
that have been noted over the time that the Jury Law has been in force. Nevertheless, such a move
towards mixed courts had been already pleaded prior to the promulgation of the Jury Law that is today
in force. See Gimeno Sendra, supra note 51, at 426.
70. For example, such an opinion is implicitly expressed in MAGDALENA GONZALEZ JIMENEZ, LA
INSTITUCI6N DEL JURADO: LA EXPERIENCIA ESPAF4OLA 335 (2006), and especially in Lozano-Higuero
Pinto, supra note 67, at 122, 128. Also such problems are contained in Respuestas a la encuesta, supra
note 67, at 144-46.
71. See M. Serra Dominguez, El Jurado: xito o fracaso, in PROBLEMAS ACTUALES DE LA
JUSTICIA PENAL 59, 62 (J. Pic6 y Junoy ed., 2001). The author supports the alternative of a mixed court.
72. See HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 7, at 177; MARDER, JURY PORCESS, supra
note 7, at 164-65; Arce & Sobra, supra note 41, at 51.
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tion for a reasoned verdict may represent an alternative to the unanimity
rule, as it obliges jurors to participate in a debate of sorts or at least forces
them to reflect more carefully on their decisions.
It is no less true, however, as is also argued, 73 that the type of scene
played out in 12 Angry Men is not frequent in judicial practice. In a more
normal deliberation process the dissenting jurors, such as Juror #8 in the
film, would be swayed by the majority. This fictional case is particularly
unusual because there was initially just one dissenting juror and he was
trying to persuade a group of men who were eager to complete their jury
service as quickly as possible. Incidentally, Spanish citizens frequently
seek to be excused from jury service for the numerous reasons that are
provided for by law. 74 Disqualification on the grounds of conscientious
objection has even been mentioned in a complainant's appeal before the
Constitutional Court (recurso de amparo), which at the time stirred up a
good deal of controversy. 75
These questions undoubtedly touch on the reluctance of citizens to
perform jury service and, more generally, the survival of the jury institution
itself, at least in Spain. Statistics on public opinion show that citizens have
less and less confidence in "lay justice" as opposed to professional jus-
tice. 76 These attitudes are more in line with the historical background of
Spanish legal practice and doctrinal debates that, as mentioned earlier, have
been stimulated by the tenth anniversary of the 1995 Jury Law,77 are un-
derway at a time when a possible move to the mixed court model is under
73. MARDER, supra note 7, at 156 (citing VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
110 (1986) (stating that outcomes such as the one in 12 Angry Men "almost never occur in real life")).
74. The LOTJ establishes complicated systems for qualification and disqualification, which are
contemplated under the legal status of the Spanish juror. In brief, aside from the requirements for
qualification, LOTJ art. 8, there are four categories for disqualification under the headings of incapac-
ity, LOTJ art. 9, incompatibility, LOTJ art. 10, prohibition, LOTJ art. 11, and excuses, LOTJ art. 12,
which contemplate various personal and professional circumstances. See Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 3,
at 174-75; see also J.L. G6mez-Colomer, Aproximaci6n al estatuto juridico de los juices legos en el
proyecto de Ley del Jurado, ACTUALIDAD JURIDICA ARANZADI, Apr. 13, 1995, at I. On this issue, with
reference to the common allegation of a cause for disqualification, see Gonzilez Garcia, supra note 38,
at 939.
75. In the only decision on this issue, STC 216/1999 of November 29, 1999, the Constitutional
Court said it was "too soon" to appreciate any possible violation of the fundamental right to conscien-
tious objection because the time to allege the causes of qualification determined by law had not yet been
reached. Consequently, given the lack of a constitutional pronouncement, it is not clear whether there is
a provision for conscientious objection. The only provision on the matter is contemplated under Article
30(2) of the Spanish Constitution and the doctrinal discussion is exclusively related to compulsory
military service, which has since been abolished.
76. See J.J. TOHARIA CORTES & J.J. GARCIA DE LA CRUZ HERRERO, LA JUSTICIA ANTE EL ESPEJO:
25 AFNOS DE ESTUDIOS DE OPINION DEL CGPJ 81-83 (2005).
77. Sources on the tenth anniversary are cited throughout this paper, but see especially MARTIN
PALLIN ET AL., supra note 38, at 189-260. For a commentary on the juridical debate, which took place
on December 13, 2005, at the Center for Juridical Studies, see Didlogos Juridicos, supra note 68.
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discussion. Nevertheless, doubts over the accuracy and even the efficiency
of the jury institution are not less prevalent in Spain than in other countries
with traditional jury systems or even mixed courts. 78
It will be fascinating to see what happens in the future in Spain and in
other countries. For example, in the U.S. there is increasing mention of the
term "cyberjuries," 79 very much in keeping with our growing attachment at
the turn of the millennium to new technology. No matter what happens in
the future, 12 Angry Men is one of the best films ever made from the per-
spective of the researcher in the field of trial by jury, and perhaps from the
point of view of many picture-goers. It was the first attempt by Hollywood
to deal with juridical issues and for that reason alone it deserves to be cele-
brated in its fiftieth anniversary. Even though the plot is dominated by the
deliberations of the jury, the film will always remain relevant because of
the various subjects that are expressed or implicitly mentioned. 80
78. See, e.g., JACKSON & DORAN, supra note 7, at 287-319 (criticizing the institution and declar-
ing that "jury trials are an anachronism of a bygone age which should be abandoned in favour of profes-
sional trials"); HELENA KENNEDY, JUST LAW 95-120 (2004) (defending the use of the institution in the
U.K.); see also BARBARA HUBER, El Jurado: Un 6rganojurisdiccional eficiente?, in CUESTIONES DEL
DERECHO PENAL EUROPEO 83 (2005) (discussing Germany's system).
In Spain, one of the most critical positions is taken by E. PEDRAZ PENALVA, Sobre el signifi-
cado y vigencia del Jurado, in CONSTITUCION, JURISDICCIN Y PROCESO 59 (1990); E. Pedraz Penalva,
El Jurado como via de participacirn popular, DIARIO LA LEY, Apr. 24, 1994, at 1. For a discussion of
the jury on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Jury Law 1995, see Alberto Montrn Redondo,
Diez ahos de Jurado: Radiografia de un error, I REVISTA DERECHO Y PROCESO (2006), available at
http://www.ucm.es/info/procesal/revista.htm.
79. See Nancy S. Marder, Cyberjuries: The Next New Thing?, 14 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 165
(2005). For interesting recommendations on jury innovations in New York State, see JURY TRIAL
INNOVATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE, available at http://www.nyjuryinnovations.org/materials/
JTI%20booklet05.pdf.
80. As previously mentioned, the roll of an ex officio defense lawyer, the death penalty, the en-
forcement of the principles of presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo, and the weakness of the
testimony evidence are some of the subjects touched upon in the film. See supra text accompanying
note 18.
2007]

